ADC Judgment: In defence of Lifu’s ruling, Federal High Court leadership, by Kayode Ajulo, SAN

●A Rejoinder to the Commentariat

Respected member of the Inner bar and Attorney-General of Ondo State, Dr Kayode Ajulo, SAN, in this piece, rejects allegations that Justice Peter Lifu’s ADC leadership judgment was politically orchestrated, urging critics to distinguish legal scrutiny from unsubstantiated claims of judicial compromise and warning against turning political suspicion into fact.

I have followed with considerable interest the growing commentaries on the recent judgment of the Federal High Court concerning the leadership crisis within the African Democratic Congress (ADC). Among them is the thoughtful intervention by Festus Adedayo, published in the Sunday Tribune of 8 November 2026, titled “Atiku, Tinubu, Justice Lifu and Death of Àà tíí gbọ́?”

Let me begin by acknowledging the considerable regard in which I hold Adedayo and several other distinguished writers who have contributed to this debate. Their intellectual contributions, commitment to public discourse and willingness to interrogate the Nigerian condition are deserving of respect. My intervention should therefore not be mistaken for a dismissal of their views. Indeed, disagreement among people who respect one another is an important feature of a healthy intellectual culture.

However, respect must not become an obligation to agree, particularly where questions of law, constitutionalism and judicial independence are involved.

What concerns me is the growing tendency to interpret the ADC judgment as evidence of a presidential conspiracy to prevent former Vice President Atiku Abubakar from contesting the 2027 presidential election. More troubling is the extension of that narrative to the administrative leadership of the Federal High Court, including suggestions that the Chief Judge has become part of an elaborate scheme to compromise the judiciary.

These are serious allegations. They deserve evidence, not merely repetition.

The political attractiveness of a narrative cannot substitute for legal accuracy or intellectual honesty.

THE DANGER OF TURNING EVERY JUDICIAL DECISION INTO A POLITICAL CONSPIRACY

There is an unfortunate tendency in our public discourse to judge judicial decisions principally by their political consequences.

When a judgment favours one political interest, the judge is praised for courage. When it produces an unfavourable outcome, the same judge may suddenly be portrayed as an instrument of an unseen political agenda.

That is not a sound basis for evaluating the administration of justice.

A judgment having political consequences does not establish that it was politically procured. Equally, an outcome that affects the political fortunes of a prominent aspirant does not, without more, prove that the Presidency engineered it.

If there is evidence of executive interference or judicial compromise, it should be presented and subjected to appropriate scrutiny. But political suspicion must not be elevated into established fact simply because respected commentators repeat it.

There is a fundamental distinction between questioning the reasoning of a judgment and questioning the integrity of the judicial officer who delivered it. The former is legitimate legal criticism; the latter requires credible evidence.

THE LEGAL HISTORY THAT MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED

A fair assessment of the ADC judgment requires an accurate understanding of the proceedings that preceded it.

The judgment delivered by Hon. Justice Musa Liman on 2 July 2026 in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1637/2025 arose from proceedings instituted by Hon. Leke Abejide, who is equally well known to me.

The proceedings before Hon. Justice Peter O. Lifu, in Suit No. FCT/ABJ/CS/1819/2025, arose from a separate action instituted by Hon. Nafiu Bala Gombe.

Although both proceedings concerned the leadership crisis within the ADC, they were distinct actions founded on different claims and legal assertions. That distinction is fundamental.

The proceedings before Justice Lifu also had their own appellate history, culminating in the Supreme Court case of Senator David Mark v. Hon. Nafiu Bala Gombe & 4 Ors., SC/CV/180/2026.

On 30 April 2026, the Supreme Court affirmed the return of the substantive proceedings to the Federal High Court for determination of the pending processes.

The Supreme Court did not determine the substantive leadership dispute in favour of either faction. Rather, it returned the matter to the trial court for adjudication.

Justice Lifu’s eventual decision must therefore be understood within that judicial history. It is inaccurate to present the judgment as though a judge of coordinate jurisdiction simply disregarded or sat on appeal over Justice Liman’s earlier decision.

The distinction between separate proceedings and an impermissible reversal of a judgment by a court of coordinate jurisdiction is not a technicality to be glossed over. It goes to the heart of the controversy.

Of course, one may disagree with Justice Lifu’s conclusions, question his reasoning or challenge the consequential orders. But such criticism must begin with an accurate account of the proceedings.

The doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel must equally be examined in the context of the parties, causes of action, issues and reliefs involved. They cannot be applied mechanically merely because two cases concern the same political party.

THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT AN INCONVENIENT FOOTNOTE

One aspect of the public commentary that deserves greater attention is the intervention of the Supreme Court.

As the apex court in our constitutional arrangement, its pronouncements on the course of litigation cannot be ignored simply because they complicate a preferred political interpretation.

To be clear, the Supreme Court did not endorse every conclusion subsequently reached by Justice Lifu, nor did it determine the substantive leadership question. But its intervention forms an essential part of the judicial chronology and must be properly acknowledged.

Legal analysis cannot be selective. We cannot celebrate the authority of the Supreme Court when its decisions align with our expectations and overlook it when they do not.

THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT DESERVES INSTITUTIONAL FAIRNESS

Perhaps even more concerning is the attempt to draw the Honourable Chief Judge of the Federal High Court, Honourable Justice John Tsoho, OFR into an alleged presidential conspiracy to compromise the judiciary.

The office of the Chief Judge carries significant judicial and administrative responsibilities, including the organisation of the Court, deployment of judicial personnel and assignment or reassignment of cases in accordance with applicable laws, rules and established practice.

These are legitimate institutional responsibilities, not powers invented to advance the interests of any political party or litigant.

The exercise of administrative authority, including the assignment or reassignment of a matter, does not, without more, establish an ulterior motive. Such decisions should be assessed against the applicable rules and circumstances, rather than interpreted automatically through political suspicion.

This is not to suggest that the Chief Judge’s administrative decisions are beyond scrutiny. They are subject to the law and legitimate institutional accountability. But scrutiny must be distinguished from insinuation, just as accountability must be distinguished from public vilification.

The Federal High Court is an independent constitutional institution, not the personal property of its Chief Judge. Equally, its judicial officers are not administrative instruments of the Presidency.

If there are demonstrable irregularities in the handling or assignment of a case, the relevant facts should be established and appropriate remedies pursued. But the mere fact that a decision produces an outcome inconvenient to certain political interests cannot justify an allegation of institutional compromise.

I respectfully urge those who rightly champion judicial independence to extend the same concern to the administrative leadership of the courts.

Judicial independence is not merely about protecting the judge who delivers a judgment. It also requires an institutional environment in which courts can discharge their responsibilities without intimidation, political pressure or campaigns of insinuation.

The Chief Judge deserves the same presumption of regularity that we extend to other public officeholders, unless credible evidence establishes otherwise.

THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF UNSUBSTANTIATED PETITIONS

There is another important lesson from the recent valedictory remarks of the retired Supreme Court Justice, Hon. Justice Uwani Musa Abba-Aji, concerning the visa restrictions reportedly imposed on her and her brothers.

Her account deserves serious reflection, particularly in light of my personal involvement in following up the matter in Washington, DC.

As a lawyer who personally pursued the matter there, my observation was that the American authorities appeared to have been confronted with a substantial volume of petitions and allegations. What struck me was the apparent influence of the sheer volume of those submissions, rather than any demonstrated determination of the substantive truth or legal merit of the allegations.

I do not suggest that every petition was necessarily false or that authorities should disregard complaints brought to their attention. My point is more fundamental: the number of allegations cannot replace the evidence required to establish them.

An allegation does not become credible merely because it is repeated, nor does a petition acquire evidential weight simply because several people submit similar accounts.

Justice Abba-Aji’s account should remind us that unsubstantiated allegations can travel beyond our shores, attract institutional consequences and inflict reputational damage long before the truth is established.

This is why the present controversy requires restraint. Criticism of judicial decisions is legitimate and necessary, but allegations of conspiracy, political interference and judicial compromise must rest on credible evidence.

We must resist the weaponisation of unsubstantiated petitions. The volume of an allegation is not the weight of its evidence; the loudness of an accusation is not proof of its truth.

A society that permits allegations to outrun evidence risks replacing the rule of law with the rule of suspicion.

ATIKU ABUBAKAR, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE RIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Let me make one point unequivocally clear: Atiku Abubakar, like every Nigerian who satisfies the constitutional requirements, is entitled to participate in the political process and seek elective office. That right deserves protection.

However, the constitutional right to contest an election must be distinguished from the obligation of a political party to comply with the law governing its internal administration.

These are related but separate questions.

The right to political participation does not exempt a political party from compliance with its constitution, the Electoral Act and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Equally, those legal requirements must never be manipulated as instruments of political exclusion.

There is no contradiction in defending Atiku Abubakar’s political rights while insisting that the ADC and its leadership must operate within the applicable legal framework.

Indeed, a democracy that protects political participation must also uphold the rule of law.

THE PRESIDENCY MUST NOT BECOME THE DEFAULT VILLAIN

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu and his administration are not beyond criticism. No government should be. The Presidency must remain accountable for its actions, policies and commitment to democratic institutions.

But accountability must be evidence-based.

The tendency to attribute every disagreement within an opposition party or every adverse judicial outcome to Aso Rock does little to advance meaningful democratic debate.

Political parties have constitutions, leadership structures and internal mechanisms for resolving disputes. They also have legal obligations. Where internal disagreements arise, the conduct of the parties and the applicable legal framework deserve proper examination.

Not every crisis within an opposition party is engineered by the Presidency. Not every judicial decision unfavourable to an opposition politician is proof of executive interference.

To suggest otherwise is to deny political actors responsibility for their own decisions and internal governance.

The opposition deserves protection against unlawful interference, but it must equally accept the discipline of the law.

When Omoyele Sowore was reportedly assaulted in Ado-Ekiti, my immediate concern was not merely the unfortunate incident itself, but a more fundamental security question: Where were the State Security Service (SSS) personnel traditionally assigned to presidential candidates?

Regardless of political affiliation or ideological differences, Sowore’s safety is a legitimate responsibility of the Nigerian state. As a recognised presidential candidate, he deserves adequate security protection to exercise his constitutional right to campaign and participate freely in the democratic process. I may disagree with some of his political positions, but I will defend his right to safety and protection without discrimination. Political disagreement must never translate into security and judicial discrimination.

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO CRITICISE

Nothing in this intervention should be understood as suggesting that judicial decisions are immune from public scrutiny. Far from it.

As a lawyer, I believe that judgments must withstand rigorous legal examination. Judges are human, judicial decisions can be erroneous, and the judiciary must remain accountable within the constitutional framework.

But there is a difference between challenging judicial reasoning and imputing improper motives to judicial officers without evidence.

Sections 6 and 36 of the 1999 Constitution establish important foundations for the exercise of judicial power and the right to fair hearing, while section 223 addresses democratic governance within political parties. These constitutional provisions must be understood within their proper contexts and not selectively invoked.

Where a judgment is considered erroneous, the appellate process provides the appropriate avenue for correction. Where judicial misconduct is alleged, the relevant investigative and disciplinary mechanisms should be engaged.

The judicial process must not be displaced by trial through newspaper columns or social media verdicts.

Our courts must be able to discharge their responsibilities without the constant threat of being labelled political agents whenever their decisions disappoint a particular constituency.

AND FINALLY, ÀÀ TÍÍ GBỌ́?

I appreciate the broader philosophical concern behind the question of Àà tíí gbọ́? and the erosion of moral restraint in our public life.

The Yoruba values of Ìtìjú, Àà tíí gbọ́? and Òdodo remind us that honour, conscience and truth must remain indispensable to public conduct.

But these values must apply universally: to politicians and public officers, judges and lawyers, journalists and public intellectuals alike.

The responsibility of the intellectual is not merely to provoke debate or expose perceived wrongdoing. It is equally to distinguish established facts from assumptions, evidence from suspicion, and legal conclusions from political interpretations.

Those privileged to shape public opinion must appreciate the consequences of their words, particularly when the integrity of constitutional institutions is at stake.

One can disagree with a judgment without questioning the integrity of the judge. One can criticise a government without attributing every development to a presidential conspiracy. One can defend an opposition politician’s constitutional rights without overlooking the legal obligations of his political party.

That is the intellectual discipline our public discourse requires.

I therefore respectfully invite our distinguished writers, commentators and public intellectuals to revisit the facts, examine the complete judicial history and interrogate the law on its own merits.

My intervention is neither a defence of any political personality nor an attempt to shield the Presidency from legitimate criticism. It is a call for accuracy, constitutionalism and fairness in our assessment of the judicial process.

I remain firmly persuaded that Atiku Abubakar’s political rights deserve constitutional protection. Equally, no political aspiration, however prominent, can dispense with compliance with the law.

Our concern must extend beyond Justice Lifu to the entire judicial institution, including the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court. Neither a judicial decision nor the lawful exercise of administrative responsibility should be converted into evidence of conspiracy without proof.

The independence of the judiciary must be defended as an institution, not selectively celebrated when its decisions align with our political preferences.

Ultimately, the question is not whether a judgment favours Atiku, Tinubu, David Mark or any other political actor. It is whether the decision is supported by the law and whether the constitutional process has been respected.

We must not allow political suspicion to replace legal reasoning, nor permit the convenience of a conspiracy narrative to overwhelm intellectual honesty.

And if we must ask Àà tíí gbọ́?, let us also ask: Ṣé òtítọ́ la ń sọ? “Are we telling the truth?”

For, in the final analysis, the greatest obligation of the intellectual is not to be politically convenient, but to be intellectually honest.

@kayodeAjulo